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Potential Politburo and Secretariat Members: Implications for Soviet Policy

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A Research Paper

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September 1985*

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [] the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Domestic Policy Division, SOVA, []

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Summary

*Information available
as of 2 July 1985
was used in this report.*

An entire generation of Soviet leaders is leaving the scene at roughly the same time, prompting intense speculation in the West about the likely impact of "generational change" on future Soviet decisionmaking. This speculation has been heightened by the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev, at age 54 the youngest party chief since Stalin. The initial promotions under Gorbachev indicate that new members of the Politburo and Secretariat, like their predecessors, will be selected from a relatively small circle of officials who combine full membership in the Central Committee with key positions in the party apparatus or important government bodies, such as the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and the Presidiums of the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet.

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An examination of a sample of 38 officials who meet these selection criteria suggests that this turnover at the top will not lead to the rise of a single new generation. Indeed, the ages of those promoted in the first round of leadership changes under Gorbachev in April 1985 ranged from 55 to 73. Although most officials in the sample have suffered from the cadre stability of the Brezhnev years, the effect of their long wait in the wings is uncertain; it could lead them to adopt a more activist approach when they achieve power, but may only have served to reinforce the traditional Soviet bureaucratic bias toward conformity and compliance.

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Our ability to assess the impact these potential leaders might have on Soviet policy is limited by the narrow boundaries of permissible public discussion in the USSR and our inability to predict how their current views might be altered by political expediency or the broader perspective of a Politburo or Secretariat post. Given these caveats, however, the public statements of our sample of potential leaders suggest a number of policy areas where a consensus or divergence of views could soon have an impact at the highest level of Soviet decisionmaking.

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The generally conservative attitudes expressed by these officials, together with their emphasis on discipline and order as a means of improving productivity, suggest that a return to some form of neo-Stalinist orthodoxy would be easier for them to accept than any significant liberalization of the system. Most members of the group, however, seem to favor an approach that lies somewhere between these two extremes.

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Judging from their statements, these officials would preserve the system's basic features of state ownership and central planning but attempt to introduce some much needed efficiencies. Most would support a package of such measures that included:

- The devolution of some additional planning and management authority, especially in the social welfare area, to the regional level.
- The merging of narrowly specialized ministries and state committees.
- The adoption of a more programmatic approach to planning and the creation of interdepartmental organs to manage target programs.
- Greater emphasis on "self-financing" (requiring operating expenses to be covered by revenues), contract brigades that operate on a profit-and-loss basis, and similar measures designed to improve productivity. []

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There were wide variations in the severity of their criticism of current planning and management policies, however, suggesting differences in the priority they would attach to such reforms. Attitudes among this sample group of potential leaders ranged from those of Kiev City party leader Yuriy Yel'chenko, who appeared relatively sanguine about present practices, to those of Krasnoyarsk Kray party chief Petr Fedirko, who issued at least 16 statements that were critical of central planning and management during the period under review. []

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Because these officials are not currently involved in weighing the resource needs of all sectors of the economy, the implications of their views on such resource decisions must be highly tentative. Their statements suggest:

- Strong sentiment in favor of additional resources for social and consumer programs, with proponents basing their arguments on the benefits that would accrue to the economy as a whole.
- A disinclination, under present circumstances, to make a substantial increase in the growth rate of defense spending, which most of these officials appear to consider adequate for projected needs.
- An apparent belief, nonetheless, that current defense spending levels are necessary and that any increase in allocations to meet social needs would have to come from increased productivity and savings, rather than diversions from defense. []

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Less typical of this group were comments from officials such as Central Committee department chief Vadim Zagladin, who expressed concern about the need to develop "sensible" patterns of consumption and worried that material well-being could lead to "money grubbing." Some members of the defense establishment, such as Marshals Viktor Kulikov and Vasiliy Petrov, also appear to have pressed for additional resources for defense with little thought about the impact this would have on other sectors of the economy. [REDACTED]

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Officials in the foreign affairs and national security establishments have shown varying degrees of flexibility on East-West issues as well as differing sensitivities to the domestic costs of the arms race—variables that suggest US interests could be affected by the outcome of the selection process:

- In the Central Committee apparatus, Zagladin appears to be more flexible and less inclined to see issues in strictly ideological terms than his fellow department chief, Leonid Zamyatin.

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- In the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin is reported to have a personal commitment to improved Soviet-US relations that seems lacking in First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko, whose attitude has sometimes been criticized as counterproductive by Soviet officials favoring an improvement of the relationship. [REDACTED]

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All, however, seem to acknowledge the centrality of the United States in Soviet foreign policy decisions and to agree on the desirability of pursuing additional arms control agreements. For some, these agreements may be desirable simply to facilitate Soviet planning and lessen the possibility of technological surprise. For those who would devote additional resources to other ends, however, the cost-avoidance benefits of such agreements appear to give them a higher priority. [REDACTED]

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These potential Politburo and Secretariat members are not inclined to be any more tolerant of political and ideological diversity in Eastern Europe and other socialist countries than the leaders they would be replacing. Although they presumably would leave the door open to improved relations with the Chinese, their statements suggest little optimism that a normalization of relations will come soon. There also seems to be a lack of enthusiasm among these officials about aid to most Third World countries, possibly reflecting some concern about the economic burden of that assistance. The Middle East, however, appears to be recognized as an area of strategic geopolitical importance for which the cost of Soviet involvement may be less subject to question. [REDACTED]

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In sum, the statements of these potential leaders provide no evidence that the turnover at the top will create a readymade coalition for across-the-board changes in Soviet policy. On many issues, the views of potential Politburo and Secretariat members appear about the same as those of the leaders they would succeed, arguing for policy continuity. On others, such as the relationship with the United States, a divergence of attitudes among these officials suggests that the policy impact will depend on which of them is selected for promotion. On still other issues, such as economic management reform, there appears to be a consensus for change, but varying perceptions of the degree of urgency involved. [REDACTED]

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The Soviet Union's capacity for change will ultimately be determined by the inclinations and abilities of its new party chief and the coalition he is able to build of like-minded leaders. Gorbachev already has succeeded in promoting Lev Zaykov and Boris Yel'tsin—two officials in the sample who seem to share his policy orientation—to the Secretariat, and there is no shortage of others in the sample whose views appear compatible with his:

- In the economic area, many seem to share his belief that management has become overly centralized and that greater emphasis should be placed on financial incentives.
- Among the foreign policy specialists, some also have deemphasized ideological polemics when they thought it served Soviet interests—demonstrating a compatibility with Gorbachev's more tactically flexible approach. [REDACTED]

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Not all of these potential leaders, however, appear to be as sympathetic to the new party chief's views. Gorbachev's recent hints that some leaders feel he is moving too fast in his efforts to revitalize the economy suggest that he does not have carte blanche to pursue his policies as vigorously as he would prefer and that others may attempt to slow his momentum. The kinds of officials selected for leadership positions, therefore, will continue to serve as important indicators of his ability to effect significant policy changes.

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Potential Politburo and Secretariat Members: Implications for Soviet Policy

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Introduction

The Soviet Union is currently in the midst of a significant leadership turnover. For the past two decades, a policy of "cadre stability"—adopted in reaction to Nikita Khrushchev's frequent and sometimes capricious personnel changes—has made death and old age the principal causes of removal from high office. As a result, an entire generation of leaders is leaving the scene at roughly the same time. Death has claimed eight members of the leadership—including three General Secretaries—within the past three years and is likely to remove at least five more, if they have not "voluntarily" retired, by the end of the decade.

Vacancies in the Politburo and Secretariat have been and will continue to be filled by officials drawn from a relatively small circle of party and government bureaucrats. A basic prerequisite for such advancement is full membership in the Central Committee—a status held by about 320 officials and workers. However, given the pattern of previous selections, only about 100 Central Committee members have any real opportunity to advance to the Politburo and Secretariat. These officials hold key positions in the central and regional party apparatus and a few important government bodies—the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, the Committee for State Security (KGB), and the Presidiums of the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet.

Despite our ability to identify this circle of potential leaders, we know little about their views or the impact their advancement might have on Soviet policy. Comments from those Soviets who have been willing to discuss the issue have been conflicting. Some have insisted that the West should negotiate with the current group of Soviet leaders before a "less flexible" group moves into place. Others, however, have described these same future leaders as more reform minded and pragmatic than their predecessors and more likely to be influenced by the economic benefits of improved relations with the West.



Figure 1. General Secretary Gorbachev, age 54, with the two most influential representatives of the Politburo's "Old Guard"—President Gromyko, 75, and Premier Tikhonov, 80 (right to left)

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This paper examines a group of 38 potential leaders (see table 1) for clues to their likely policy orientation. The sample includes top officials in important oblast and kray party committees in the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and Ukraine, selected departments of the CPSU Central Committee, and the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Since the research for the paper was completed, three officials in the sample—Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov and former oblast first secretaries Boris Yel'tsin and Lev Zaykov—have already moved into leadership positions, while two Foreign Ministry officials have probably been eliminated from immediate contention by the appointment of former Georgian party leader Eduard Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹ The

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¹ The four officials elected to full Politburo membership since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power—Viktor Chebrikov, Yegor Ligachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and Eduard Shevardnadze—were not included in the sample because they already were candidate members of the Politburo (Chebrikov and Shevardnadze) or Central Committee Secretaries (Ligachev and Ryzhkov).

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Table 1
Sample Group of Potential Leaders

	Age	Position		Age	Position
Viktor Afanas'yev	62	Chief Editor, <i>Pravda</i>	Yevgeniy Murav'yev	55	First Secretary, Kuybyshev Oblast (RSFSR)
Sergey Akhromeyev	62	Chief of General Staff, Ministry of Defense	Vladislav Mysnichenko	55	First Secretary, Khar'kov Oblast (Ukraine)
Nikolay Aksenov ^a	56	First Secretary, Altay Kray (RSFSR)	Nikolay Ogarkov ^c	67	Marshal of the Soviet Union; former Chief of General Staff
Gennadiy Bogomyakov	55	First Secretary, Tyumen' Oblast (RSFSR)	Vasiliy Petrov	68	First Deputy Minister of Defense
Viktor Boyko	53	First Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast (Ukraine)	Oleg Rakhmanin	60	First Deputy Chief, Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, CPSU Central Committee
Aleksey Chernyy	63	First Secretary, Khabarovsk Kray (RSFSR)	Georgiy Razumovskiy ^d	48	First Secretary, Krasnodar Kray (RSFSR)
Viktor Dobrik	57	First Secretary, L'vov Oblast (Ukraine)	Nikolay Slyun'kov	56	First Secretary, Belorussian Party Central Committee
Anatoliy Dobrynin	65	Ambassador to United States	Leonid Smirnov	69	Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers; Chairman, Military-Industrial Commission
Petr Fedirko	52	First Secretary, Krasnoyarsk Kray (RSFSR)	Sergey Sokolov ^e	74	Minister of Defense
Dmitriy Gagarov	NA	First Secretary, Primorskiy Kray (RSFSR)	Inamdzhan Usmankhodzhayev	54	First Secretary, Uzbek Party Central Committee
Leonid Gorshkov ^b	54	First Secretary, Kemerovo Oblast (RSFSR)	Gennadiy Vedernikov	47	First Secretary, Chelyabinsk Oblast (RSFSR)
Vladimir Gusev ^b	52	First Secretary, Saratov Oblast (RSFSR)	Aleksandr Vlasov	53	First Secretary, Rostov Oblast (RSFSR)
Vadim Ignatov	54	First Secretary, Voronezh Oblast (RSFSR)	Yuriy Yel'chenko	55	First Secretary, Kiev (Ukraine)
Boris Kachura	54	Secretary, Ukrainian Party Central Committee	Boris Yel'tsin ^f	53	First Secretary, Sverdlovsk Oblast (RSFSR)
Vladimir Kalashnikov	56	First Secretary, Volgograd Oblast (RSFSR)	Vadim Zagladin	58	First Deputy Chief, International Department, CPSU Central Committee
Yuriy Khristoradnov	55	First Secretary, Gor'kiy Oblast (RSFSR)	Leonid Zamyatin	63	Chief, International Information Department, CPSU Central Committee
Vasiliy Konotop	68	First Secretary, Moscow Oblast (RSFSR)	Lev Zaykov ^g	62	First Secretary, Leningrad Oblast (RSFSR)
Georgiy Korniyenko	60	First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs			
Viktor Kulikov	64	First Deputy Minister of Defense; Commander in Chief, Warsaw Pact Forces			
Vasiliy Mironov	60	First Secretary, Donetsk Oblast (Ukraine)			
Vsevolod Murakhovskiy	58	First Secretary, Stavropol' Kray (RSFSR)			

^a Aksenov died after research for this paper was completed; his views appear to be representative of those held by others at this level, however, and hence remain relevant for the purpose of this paper.

^b In March 1985, Gorshkov became a deputy chairman and Gusev became first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. If Vorotnikov should succeed Premier Tikhonov, [redacted]

[redacted] Gusev is now well positioned to assume Vorotnikov's post as chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, a position that normally warrants Politburo membership.

^c Despite Ogarkov's removal from his post as Chief of the General Staff in September 1984, his views were considered relevant to this

study of future Politburo leaders' views, given the possibility that his setback may be only temporary, [redacted] and that his views may be shared by others.

^d Razumovskiy became chief of the Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department in June 1985.

^e Sokolov became a candidate member of the Politburo in April 1985.

^f Yel'tsin became chief of the Central Committee's Construction Department in April 1985 and a CPSU Secretary in July 1985.

^g Zaykov became a CPSU Secretary in July 1985.

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chief purpose of the paper, however, is not to predict which of these officials will be promoted to leadership posts but to examine the range of policy views they express and its likely implications for future Soviet policy. []

Future Leaders: Backgrounds and Careers

Formative Influences

The average age of officials in this sample of potential leaders is 58—about nine years younger than the average in the current Politburo (67.5) and Secretariat (66.8). This younger group is not of one political generation, however; it includes 10 officials who entered the party during World War II, nine who joined during the reconstruction period, and 17 who joined after Stalin's death.² []

Although we cannot predict the Politburo's exact generational makeup, it seems probable that by the end of this decade one generation will have lost its representation on that body and another will have gained it for the first time. Leaving the scene will be those officials who began their party careers during Stalin's efforts to modernize industry and collectivize agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These leaders helped build the political and economic superstructure that exists today and, in the judgment of both Soviet and Western observers, tend to have a stronger ideological and emotional commitment to the past than subsequent generations. The passing of this generation, it has been argued, could produce an atmosphere somewhat more conducive to change. []

Moving into the Politburo for the first time will be representatives of the generation that entered the party after Stalin's death. These officials began their careers at a time when the party's doors were opened more widely to new members and political discussion became less ideological. They also enjoyed a higher level of intellectual freedom and material well-being than their elders. Because of this, it has been speculated that members of the post-Stalin generation may be relatively more tolerant of dissent, more materialistic,

² Party entry dates were unavailable for a few officials in the sample. []

Table 2
Military Service of Current
and Potential Soviet Leaders

Percent

	Current Leaders	Sample Group of Potential Leaders
Military experience	37.5	29.7
Service during World War II	20.8	24.3

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and less likely to fear competition or comparison with the West. Sergey Rogov, a young specialist in US affairs at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, also has argued that officials of the post-Stalin generation consider Soviet-US "detente" to be the normal state of affairs and view the current downturn in relations with greater alarm than their elders, who regard detente as an aberration. []

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Wartime Experience

Although the wartime generation (those who entered the party during World War II) is more heavily represented in the current leadership than among our potential leaders, the percentage that saw military service during the war is about the same in both groups (see table 2). The average current leader was in his early twenties when the war broke out, however, while the average potential leader had just entered his teens. Wartime memories, therefore, are generally less vivid for these potential leaders than for their predecessors. Although this could make future leaders less sensitive to the danger and consequences of war, some Soviet officials have worried that it might have the opposite effect. Wrote one military official:

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Two new generations of people have grown up without any knowledge of war based on personal experience. They have the idea that peace is the normal state of society. At the same time, the ranks of those who participated in the Great Patriotic War and can pass their experiences on to younger generations are becoming thinner. As

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a result, questions of the struggle for peace are sometimes interpreted not from class positions, but somewhat simplistically; any kind of peace is good, any kind of war is bad.

Slow Climb to the Top

A comparison of career profiles also reveals that the advancement of our average potential leader has been considerably slower than that of today's average leader. The potential leader:

- Received his first important post about three years later in his career than today's leader.
- Has held his current job five years longer than his counterpart held his last post before entering the Politburo or Secretariat.
- Is about a year *older* than his counterpart was at the time he entered the leadership.

Younger officials in the sample, however, have less room for complaint than some of their older colleagues. Those who joined the party after Stalin's death (in 1953) received their first important posts more than two years earlier, on the average, than older officials in the sample, possibly because of a better quality of education. They also have held their current assignments for a shorter time than others in the sample.

The generally slower rate of advancement of the average potential leader, nonetheless, almost certainly has been a cause of some personal frustration.³ Although we might infer that this frustration has also made them more impatient with existing policies and practices, it may simply have increased their eagerness to please their superiors—an impulse that could lead to increased conformity with established views. The latter tendency has been more obvious to analysts at the US Embassy in Moscow, who once observed that young officials who move up are “more likely to share the characteristics of their predecessors than those of their peers.”

³ One local party chief recently complained that “there are quite a few leaders in the republic who have sat in their posts for more than one decade and have gained the reputation of being irreplaceable. Those who are getting ready to take over from them and who could have done a better job have grown old and the original leaders are still there. To justify this, people say: ‘They are experienced.’”

Table 3
Educational Qualifications of
Current and Potential Leaders

Percent

	Current Leaders	Sample Group of Potential Leaders
Higher education	95.8	100.0
Graduate education ^a	16.6	13.5
Specialist education ^b	62.5	72.9
Party school education	12.5	5.4

^a Graduate education is defined as either a candidate's or doctor's degree.

^b Educational training in the areas of agriculture, industry, transportation, or science.

Educational Trends

A majority of both the current and potential leaders have had a specialized technical education (in agriculture, metallurgy, and so forth), and that trend appears to be growing, judging from the high percentage of potential leaders who have such a background. Advanced degrees in such specialties are slightly less common among potential leaders (see table 3), but, for those working in areas such as foreign affairs and interparty relations, postgraduate training appears to have become more important. Potential leaders in this category hold degrees in such disciplines as history and philosophy—a contrast with current leaders, whose degrees are almost solely in engineering.

Such statistical comparisons, however, do not reveal important qualitative differences in the education of current and potential leaders. Members of the post-Stalin generation, in particular, have benefited from an education that has been less subject to significant interruptions, a less repressive and ideological scholastic environment, and significantly strengthened curriculums.

Although emphasis on party training has been somewhat cyclical over the years (it declined under Khrushchev and increased under Leonid Brezhnev), our

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group of potential leaders contains a smaller percentage of party school graduates than the current Politburo. Party training emphasizes ideological, historical, and party organizational themes and has been a powerful tool for instilling appropriate modes of behavior and acceptable political viewpoints. An apparent deemphasis on such training in our group of potential leaders, therefore, has lessened the impact of what traditionally has been a profoundly conservative influence. []

Apprenticeship in Party Work

These potential leaders, nonetheless, have spent most of their lives in a political environment that would tend to discourage nonconformity. Like current Soviet leaders, they would be moving into the leadership after devoting more than half of their careers, on the average, to party work. Few have worked for any significant amount of time in a nonpolitical institutional environment. (Members of this group of potential leaders have spent an average of 6.9 years in economic production work, compared to an average of 8.6 years among current leaders.) Their working environment, therefore, has been one that tends to foster an "apparatus mentality" and discourage the emergence of "noncompany" attitudes. []

Policy Views: A Look at the Record

Such generalizations about the impact of background and experience must, of course, be highly speculative. To gain a better understanding of the policy orientation of these officials, therefore, we reviewed more than 400 of their articles and speeches published during the past six years. []

Such content analysis admittedly has its own limitations. Our ability to assess the impact these potential leaders might have on policy is limited by the narrow boundaries of permissible public discussion in the Soviet Union and our inability to predict how their current views might be altered by political expediency or the broader perspective of the Politburo or Secretariat. (Because of this we have highlighted the views of those officials, typified by Zagladin, who deviate, however slightly, from the official line and define the

limits of discussion.) Given these caveats, however, the public statements of these officials suggest a number of policy areas where a consensus or divergence of views could soon have an impact at the highest level of Soviet decisionmaking. []

Foreign Policy Views

Regional party chiefs—the largest category in our sample of potential Soviet leaders—rarely address foreign policy issues. Virtually the only time they do so is at party congresses, which usually convene only at five-year intervals.⁴ The foreign policy views in this sample, therefore, come largely from representatives of the foreign affairs and national security establishment—the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the foreign relations departments of the CPSU Central Committee. Although this imbalance skews our findings, the officials who are now addressing these issues are potential successors to posts that seem likely to give them greater weight than others in the sample in future foreign policy deliberations.⁵ []

Perceptions of International Environment

If these potential leaders have a unique world view, it is not apparent in their statements, which seldom

⁴ Although these speeches are infrequent, a study by Peter Hauslohner of Yale University found that regional party leaders have devoted an increasing amount of attention to foreign policy. Hauslohner found that, of the 65 speeches delivered by these officials at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 and the 22nd in 1961, 62 percent contained no separate passage on international relations. By the 25th Congress in 1976, however, almost all of the regional leaders who addressed the congress made some reference to foreign policy issues. Moreover, those regional leaders who took part in the discussion of the Central Committee's main report devoted an average of 15 percent of their speeches to foreign affairs—roughly twice as much as at either of the two previous congresses. One possible impetus for this increase, Hauslohner suggests, is a growing awareness among these officials that an expanded Soviet military and political involvement abroad, growing economic interdependencies, and scientific and cultural ties also have an impact on the domestic issues that dominate regional agenda. ("Prefects as Senators: Soviet Regional Politicians Look to Foreign Policy," by Peter Hauslohner, *World Politics*, vol. 33, No. 2, January 1981.) []

⁵ For example, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, has been rumored recently as a likely successor to candidate Politburo member Ponomarev, who oversees relations with non-Bloc Communist parties. []

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deviate from established guidelines. For example, officials in this sample began referring to “heightened international tensions” that have increased the “danger of war” in 1980, shortly after this theme was officially sanctioned by a Central Committee decree.⁶ In the early 1980s, such negative assessments were balanced by an almost equal number of references to the continued viability of “detente” and the Soviet “peace program.” During 1984, however, these more positive expressions were outnumbered (three to one) by references to the deteriorating international situation and heightened danger of war—a shift that may have reflected genuine concern about the INF deployments in Western Europe but that also was part of an orchestrated campaign to alarm West Europeans about the consequences of those deployments. []

Although no generational or institutional differences are apparent in these assessments of the international situation, a few officials have taken positions that depart somewhat from the norm. Warsaw Pact Commander Viktor Kulikov, for example, has made more frequent reference than others in the sample to the increased danger of war—a position consistent with his record as one of the more vigorous proponents of a strengthened national defense.⁷ On the other hand, Vadim Zagladin, the first deputy chief of the Central Committee’s International Department, has criticized those who contend that “only the worst can be expected—that we are on the threshold of war.” Zagladin has been equally critical, however, of those who say “there have been all kinds of crises, and this one, too, will pass!” Rejecting both perspectives as extreme, he has associated himself with a less sharply defined approach that apparently favors greater Soviet flexibility. While asserting that “without doubt we are capable of defending ourselves,” he has called it a mistake to wait for the crisis in East-West relations to pass of its own accord. []

The Global Struggle. Rhetoric concerning the “global struggle”—that is, reference to the ideological struggle, the gains of socialism, and other terms referring

⁶ The decree, issued in June 1980, linked the increased danger of war primarily to “adventurist actions of the US and its accomplices.” []

⁷ Kulikov nonetheless endorsed, more quickly than Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, the line that “victory” is impossible in a nuclear war. []



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Figure 2. Propagandist Zamyatin has described US foreign policy as a reflection of internal contradictions and problems. []

to the competition between socialism and capitalism—comes largely from representatives of the party’s Central Committee apparatus. An exception to this pattern is Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, whose references to conflict between the two “systems” may have been partially prescribed by his role as spokesman for party-approved strategic doctrine. []

Both Zagladin and Leonid Zamyatin (head of the International Information Department) have described international developments in terms of a global struggle between two competing social systems. Their explanations of US policy motivations, however, have been somewhat different. Zamyatin has described US foreign policy as a reflection of internal contradictions and problems in the United States and the capitalist world in general. The US “internal political task,” Zamyatin wrote in 1983, “is to try to restore the political stability of American society by creating an atmosphere of a beleaguered camp and thereby controlling manifestations of the social discontent that is inevitable under present conditions—the most acute economic crisis in the postwar period.” In another article elaborating on this theme, he concluded: “The truth is plain to see: The [US] domestic situation is dictating foreign policy.” []

Zagladin, on the other hand, has emphasized the US perception of a change in the “correlation of forces” that resulted from Soviet achievement of military-

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Figure 3. Zagladin (on left, next to his boss, Ponomarev) says it is premature to claim that capitalism has entered a new stage of crisis.

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strategic parity. In a possible reference to Zamyatin and like-minded propagandists, Zagladin wrote that, unlike "some Marxist scientists," he found it "premature" to say that the "crisis of capitalism has entered a qualitatively new stage." Moreover, he continued, "the socialist world has problems and difficulties of its own."

East-West Relations

References to East-West relations in this sample are strongly dominated by statements on arms control or the arms race. Political relations receive only half as much attention, while economic aspects of the relationship are seldom mentioned. For example, Marshal Ogarkov was the only official in this sample who publicly complained about US economic sanctions

and the curtailment of scientific and technical ties after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The frequency of comments on arms control presumably is an accurate reflection of the priority these officials assign to the strategic aspects of the relationship. Their relative inattention to economic relations, however, may reflect their sensitivity to implicitly unfavorable comparisons of Soviet and Western economies.

Depictions of United States. Public references to the United States and US policy have been predictably and consistently negative during this period of review, which coincided with a downturn in Soviet-US relations. In fact, of all the officials in this sample, only Zagladin has been somewhat selective in his criticism, coupling condemnation of present US policies with a belief that more "reasonable circles" exist and a hope that these circles eventually will prevail. His use of this formulation has made him appear more optimistic than others in the sample about the long-term prospects for improved relations. In 1983 he wrote: "By all indications, a considerable number of people in the United States hold realistic positions and, as life shows, their numbers are growing." There are "circles," he wrote, that are "sufficiently influential and that are protesting against the confrontation policy. And they still have not had their last word." Zagladin's relative optimism on this score has continued to this date and can also be seen in his criticism of those who exaggerate the danger of war.

Privately, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff, also has appeared more optimistic about the prospects for improving relations than his public stance, which has been highly critical of the United States. would suggest. In a conversation with he dismissed the rhetoric of Soviet-US polemics ("propaganda is propaganda"); referred to biases in the perspectives of

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Figure 4. Marshal Akhromeyev privately has acknowledged biases in the perspective of Soviet leaders. [redacted]

both nations' leaders; recalled the military cooperation of the two countries during World War II; and emphasized his personal desire for improved relations. Although Akhromeyev may have been posturing, his remarks contrast sharply with those of most other Soviet officials, which at that time were generally as negative in a one-on-one setting as in their public pronouncements. [redacted]

The Foreign Ministry officials in the sample—Anatoliy Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and Georgiy Korniyenko, the First Deputy Foreign Minister—appear to have somewhat differing attitudes regarding Soviet-US relations. [redacted]

[redacted] Dobrynin has a genuine personal commitment to improving Soviet-US relations and has done what he could to support those Politburo members who share his view. By contrast, Korniyenko, whom Shevchenko found to be more skeptical of US motives, has sometimes been so harsh in his criticism of the United States [redacted]

Nature of the Threat. These officials see the threat posed by the United States chiefly in a military context. Criticism consists primarily of allegations that the United States has escalated the arms race, adopted a military strategy based upon a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union, and embraced the concept of limited nuclear war. Predictably, given the period of analysis, it is the alleged US effort to alter

the military balance of power by deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe that receives the strongest condemnation. US "adventurism"—chiefly in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—also is depicted as destabilizing and threatening to world peace but receives far less emphasis than the strategic threat. [redacted]

The US "ideological threat" has a still lower priority in the statements of these officials, drawing fire primarily from propagandist Zamyatin and a few local party officials whose regions have been particularly vulnerable to "contamination" by Western ideas. Zamyatin has complained that the US "ideological war" is aimed at "weakening and splitting" socialist countries and is trying to "isolate states in Africa and Latin America from the Soviet Union, from socialism." A few officials, however, such as Leningrad Oblast party chief Lev Zaykov (now a CPSU Secretary) and L'vov Oblast first secretary Viktor Dobrik, have been more concerned about the impact US propaganda might have on Soviet citizens. Zaykov, for example, has warned that "ideological subversion by the class enemy" requires a constant increase in the political vigilance of Leningrad party organizations, which were instructed to suppress the "malevolent fabrications planted by Western propaganda centers." [redacted]

US economic power is seldom depicted by these officials as posing a threat to Soviet interests. The exceptions have been Ogarkov's outcries against US sanctions imposed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and complaints from Ogarkov, Zamyatin, and Marshal Akhromeyev that US strategists are trying, without success, to exhaust the USSR's economy through their escalation of the arms race. [redacted]


Other Western Countries. Officials in this sample have focused most of their criticism on the United States (see figure 5) and have seldom differentiated between US actions and intentions and those of other Western powers. The exceptions have been the Central Committee's foreign affairs specialists, Zagladin

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Figure 5
Foreign Policy Focus of
Potential Soviet Leaders

Number of articles and speeches by subject



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and Zamyatin, who usually place greater emphasis on the divergent interests of Western nations. Zamyatin, for example, has written that US efforts to discourage Soviet-West European trade—"an area of immense contradiction between the United States and its NATO allies"—causes serious damage to local markets in Western Europe. Expressing a similar view, Zagladin told an interviewer: "Western Europe and Japan have become very impressive political and economic quantities that are by no means willing to yield to Washington's pressure on everything."

This more sophisticated perspective appears to be largely institutional. Both Zamyatin and Zagladin have Central Committee jobs that give them important roles in exploiting Western differences, both as propagandists and as participants in the coordination and formulation of Soviet covert action (so-called active measures). Zagladin's role is so important, in fact, that KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko has credited him personally with whatever recent success Soviet propaganda and active measures have had in Western Europe.

In sum, these officials, as a group, do not appear to have a unique world view. Their publicly expressed views, not unexpectedly, differ little from those of the

leaders they would replace (see appendix A). All, for example, place the blame for increased international tensions on the West, and primarily on the United States. Within this group, nonetheless, there are some notable differences of perception about how close the world has come to the brink of war, how this has come about, and the prospects for improved East-West relations.

Other International Issues

No such differences are apparent, however, in their discussions of other international issues. All who have addressed the topics have taken a fairly hard line on East European political reform and the failure of other Communist or socialist parties—whether in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, or China—to align themselves with official Soviet positions. More surprising is the virtual silence from these officials on most Third World issues, which may reflect a lack of enthusiasm about the economic burden of aid to Third World countries. The Middle East, by contrast, appears to be recognized as an area of strategic geopolitical importance for which the cost of Soviet involvement may be less subject to question.

Eastern Europe

Officials in this sample have given no hints of being any more tolerant of East European political reform or nonalignment with Soviet positions than their Politburo counterparts. Oleg Rakhmanin, the first deputy chief of the Central Committee's Bloc Liaison Department, has condemned both "rightwingers and leftwingers" who believe a country should have its own model of socialism, "disregarding the experience of the Soviet Union and other fraternal states." Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov has taken an equally hard line on such deviations—most notably during the Polish crisis, when his remarks seemed to convey a more alarmist assessment of the situation than those of most other Soviet officials. Kulikov's remarks also have reflected the push for a more "integrated," that is, Soviet-dominated, military command system in Eastern Europe.

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The only regional leaders in the sample who have referred to the Polish issue are the Ukrainians, whose proximity to Poland has made them especially sensitive to developments there. The first secretaries of both the L'vov Oblast and Kiev City party committees placed the blame for the crisis almost solely on Western "imperialism" and cited the Polish example as justification for their campaigns to increase local vigilance against foreign propaganda. [redacted]

In the Central Committee apparatus, Zamyatin and Zagladin have, as on other issues, taken somewhat divergent positions on Poland. Zamyatin, like the Ukrainians, has portrayed the situation chiefly as a consequence of "Washington's ideological war," which was designed to push the Polish people into "fratricidal conflict." Zagladin, by contrast, has said that Western pressures only "played a role" in the crisis but that it was precipitated by "serious problems in the political, economic, and social fields."

[redacted]

The Foreign Ministry officials in our sample have not publicly addressed Soviet-East European relations, probably because this issue is within the province of the Central Committee. [redacted]

[redacted]

China

Of the few officials in this sample who have addressed the issue of Sino-Soviet relations, most have appeared generally pessimistic about the prospects for normalization. Shortly after the renewed Soviet effort to improve the relationship in 1982, Zagladin emphasized the signs of positive change in Chinese domestic policy and relations with the USSR while cautioning that China "always moves slowly." Rakhmanin—the Central Committee's chief Sinologist—remained as pessimistic as ever, however, complaining that China's "common cause" with Western "imperialists" was continuing to encourage its "rightist tendencies." Zamyatin, too, has found little positive to say about Chinese policy. In January 1984, during a televised



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Figure 6. Aleksey Chernyy,
First Secretary of the Khaba-
rovsk Kray Party Committee

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Figure 7. Viktor Afanas'yev,
Chief Editor of Pravda [redacted]

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discussion of the Chinese Premier's trip to the United States, he was unwilling even to praise the Premier's condemnation of US policy in the Near East and Grenada, dismissing those remarks as primarily designed to impress the Third World. [redacted]

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Of the regional leaders in the sample, only Khabarovsk Kray First Secretary Aleksey Chernyy, whose kray (territory) sits on the Chinese border, has publicly addressed the subject. In 1981 he said that the "people of the Far East" condemned Chinese "adventurist policy" and that his party committee was doing everything necessary "to ensure the impregnability of our socialist homeland's Far Eastern borders." A few years earlier, Chernyy had startled a visiting Western

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interviewer by brandishing an old French newspaper article he kept in his desk and praising the prescience of the article's title, which read: "Sooner or Later All Whites Must Unite Against the Yellow Peril." [redacted]

Eurocommunism

Only two officials in the sample—Afanas'yev and Zagladin—have dealt with the issue of Western Europe's more independent-minded Communist parties. Of the two, Afanas'yev has been the more consistently inflexible on the subject. [redacted]

[redacted] In 1978, when relations were tense between the Soviet and Spanish parties, Afanas'yev reportedly described the Spanish Party Congress [redacted] as more of a "happening" than a party congress. [redacted]

Zagladin's record on this issue has been less consistent than that of Afanas'yev. Although he had an early history of taking a more flexible stance, his position seems to have become increasingly rigid. In recent years he has been harshly critical of West European Communist parties for their "unevenness" in supporting the peace movement and for accepting the notion that Moscow bore some responsibility for increased international tensions. In 1984 Zagladin warned his West European comrades that imperialist "power centers" were devoting increasing attention to influencing the Communist movement and cited as evidence a remark by Zbigniew Brzezinski that the United States favored "the greatest possible pluralization of Marxism." [redacted]

Third World

Soviet relations with Third World countries receive much less public attention from these officials than relations with the West or the socialist Bloc. Their frequent failure to mention that area of the world may reflect a lack of enthusiasm among these officials about the economic burden of aid to Third World countries. The few who address the issue, however, depict such aid in terms of a socialist obligation to assist "democratic national liberation movements"

against imperialist efforts to "export counterrevolution." Zagladin, for example, has written of the necessity to strengthen "peace-loving" states of the developing world, noting that to do otherwise is to aid those who are attacking "young revolutionary democratic regimes." [redacted]

Such ideological rhetoric is rarely used to describe the Middle East, however, suggesting that these officials share the long-held Soviet view that the area's geopolitical strategic importance outweighs its role as battleground for the national liberation movement. [redacted]

Domestic Policy Views

Economic Planning and Management

Domestic economic issues dominate the public agenda of most officials in this sample group. For the most part, however, these officials deal with economic problems at the microlevel and do not directly address such larger issues as planning and management reform. Even the word "reform" is virtually taboo in such pronouncements, presumably for fear it might raise the specter of changes that could challenge powerful bureaucratic interests or even endanger political stability. [redacted]

It is not surprising, therefore, that the officials in our sample who deal most openly with the reform issue are not those directly involved in the process of economic management but "outsiders" whose relative candor on the subject presumably is less threatening to their careers. Even the boldest of these officials,

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however, have treated the issue gingerly. For example, Zagladin, one of the party's key foreign policy specialists, once told a foreign journalist that what the Soviet Union needed was a management reform that placed greater emphasis on incentives and less on administrative controls. Upon reflection, however, he tried to have his use of the word "reform" deleted from the interview. []

Similarly, Afanas'yev, the editor of *Pravda*, once openly argued for an increase in the power of the consumer relative to that of the producer and for an extension of "direct ties" between enterprises and sales outlets.⁸ (The "direct ties" system was introduced as part of the economic reform of 1965, but an intended extension of the system beyond the initial enterprises was never carried out.) Afanas'yev later appeared to be covering his tracks, however, by urging that any management changes be considered "extremely carefully" before being introduced. Anyone could sit down and describe a system of management in 10 minutes, he wrote, but Lenin had warned that "one must suppress such desires because it would be harmful and a political mistake." []

Problems and Solutions

Although careful to avoid such "political mistakes," regional party leaders in this sample are rarely hesitant about criticizing Moscow's government planners and administrators (see appendix B). These complaints appear to serve both as a diversion from any shortcomings closer to home and as an indirect and politically acceptable way of criticizing policies approved by party superiors. Nor are these officials shy about extolling local economic "experiments" they believe to have proved successful. Although these experiments are always carefully circumscribed, political careers like that of former senior secretary

⁸ Afanas'yev has taken somewhat unorthodox positions on other issues as well. [] he tried to run an expose in *Pravda* on Sergey Medunov—a corrupt local party official with reputed ties to the Brezhnev family—before Medunov succeeded in using his influence to quash the story. (During Brezhnev's waning days, the corruption scandal caught up with Medunov, and he was removed from office.) Afanas'yev also was openly critical of the military for its handling of information on the shootdown of the Korean airliner in 1983. During Chernenko's tenure, Afanas'yev was reported to have been rebuked for describing senior party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to Westerners as the "second General Secretary"—an upgrading of Gorbachev's status that Chernenko, among others, probably did not appreciate. []

Grigoriy Romanov profited greatly from an association with such "innovations." An examination of the complaints and initiatives of these officials reveals a number of management-related problems that are of common concern to them as well as the kinds of "solutions" they have proposed at the local level. []

The Need To Modernize. Although the specifics vary, complaints abound about the failure to modernize and retool existing plants and about the continued production of obsolete equipment. A typical remark came from Altay Kray First Secretary Nikolay Aksenov (recently deceased), who warned that if his kray (the most important agricultural area in Siberia) was to be developed as an "agro-industrial complex," as envisioned in the Food Program, the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building would first have to modernize the local tractor plant. Reflecting more urban concerns, Moscow Oblast First Secretary Vasily Konotop complained that a local bus plant, although recently modernized, had been told to continue producing an obsolete model that failed to meet the demands of city transportation. New models of equipment, wrote Belorussian party chief Nikolay Slyunkov, "often become obsolete even before their series production begins." []

This obsolescence, although partly a consequence of resource allocation decisions, has been exacerbated by a system of planning and management whose vertical lines of authority create bureaucratic barriers between science and industry. Recognizing this, local party leaders in the sample have experimented with a variety of schemes designed to break through those barriers and speed up the acquisition of new technology. Some, for example, have set up coordinating councils—composed of party officials, production specialists, scientists, and educators—under the kray or oblast party committees. Others have developed "target programs" for technological progress in their areas or set up associations or complexes designed to bring scientific institutes into closer contact with production enterprises. []

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


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Figure 8. Moscow Oblast First Secretary Konotop has complained about obsolete equipment. [redacted]



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Figure 9. Former Leningrad party chief Zaykov has been critical of the wage-leveling trend that prevailed under Brezhnev. [redacted]

The proponents of several of these schemes have claimed significant local results. For example, former Sverdlovsk Oblast First Secretary Boris Yel'tsin (now a CPSU Secretary) said that, after adopting a target program for technological progress, his oblast introduced new technology and inventions that resulted in a considerable savings during the 10th Five-Year Plan. According to L'vov Oblast party chief Dobrik, the development of such a program in L'vov and the establishment of "academic-scientific production associations" nearly tripled the number of applications of new technology and cut the time to introduce them in half. [redacted]

"Departmental Barriers." These potential leaders also complain about so-called departmentalism within the economy. The Soviet bureaucracy, organized on a branch-of-industry basis, has long had difficulty coping with projects that cut across sectoral lines. The

need to alleviate that problem has become more acute for regional party leaders, however, with the increased adoption of national programs focusing on particular regions (such as the West Siberian oil and gas complex) and the creation of territorial production complexes (TPKs) of functionally related, but administratively distinct, enterprises. The more outspoken officials in this area include Tyumen' Oblast First Secretary Gennadiy Bogomyakov, who has criticized the poor coordination among departments involved in the West Siberian complex, and Krasnoyarsk Kray party chief Petr Fedirko, who has complained about similar problems in the TPKs. The "bureaucratic interests" of TPK enterprises, noted Fedirko in something of an understatement, "do not always coincide." [redacted]

To overcome departmental barriers in large-scale projects and TPKs, several regional party leaders in this sample have tried to circumvent problems in Moscow by setting up councils under the krays or oblasts to coordinate the actions of all the organizations involved. Efforts also have been made to coordinate the activities of a project's primary party organizations, either by setting up a single party committee for all project workers in a given area or by establishing a council of secretaries of primary party organizations in related enterprises. One local official, Fedirko, even went so far as to call for the replication of his coordinating efforts at the national level. [redacted]

Labor Shortages and Turnover. As competition for scarce labor resources has risen, complaints about Moscow's failure to alleviate the situation have grown. In addition to grumbling about the slow introduction of laborsaving equipment, officials in this sample have been especially critical of central authorities' failure to develop the "social infrastructure" necessary to attract and retain an adequate number of workers—particularly in rural and remote areas. [redacted]

Except for experiments designed to speed up the adoption of laborsaving equipment, local officials in this sample have proposed few solutions to the labor problem. Hoping to improve productivity, a few officials, such as Leningrad Oblast First Secretary Lev Zaykov (now a CPSU Secretary) and Belorussian

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party chief Nikolay Slyun'kov, have been critical of the wage-leveling trend that prevailed under Brezhnev and, like General Secretary Gorbachev, have called for more and better financial incentives. Others, such as former Kemerovo Oblast First Secretary Leonid Gorshkov (now RSFSR Deputy Premier), have relied primarily on exhortation. []

For the most part, however, local efforts to produce more with less have been only marginally successful (see inset on "The Leningrad Experiment"). As a result, most efforts have been focused on improving the labor supply by creating commissions to "monitor" the improvement of living and working conditions in remote areas; holding periodic conferences to "study" the problem of retaining workers on the farms; and increasing the propaganda designed to make farm work more appealing to young workers. []

Inadequate Regional Control. In their attempts to solve these problems, local officials clearly have been frustrated by the limits of their influence on the planning and management process. Expressing the problem in Marxist-Leninist terms, Khabarovsk Kray First Secretary Chernyy has complained about an "incorrect correlation between centralism and the democratic principle." Other officials have offered concrete examples to underline their irritation with Moscow's heavyhandedness. L'vov Oblast First Secretary Dobrik, for example, once complained that agricultural targets were set in Moscow without the slightest consideration of regional variations in growing conditions. "In a word," he concluded, "the distribution of a single memorandum applicable to all is inadmissible"—a statement that captures the essence of the complaints from these officials about overcentralized planning and management. This view is apparently shared by former regional leader Gorbachev, who recently criticized "the ambition to regulate everything from the center." []

The social dimensions of economic planning are strongly emphasized by these regional officials, who regard the development of local plans for social

The Leningrad Experiment

In July 1983 Leningrad began an experiment at five production complexes that was designed to decrease the number of technical personnel while simultaneously maintaining or increasing productivity. These goals were to be achieved by giving more money—obtained by freezing wage funds and then releasing "superfluous" personnel—to participating workers. Although the two main goals of the experiment reportedly are being met, there apparently is no standard method for determining which workers are superfluous, which of them qualify for supplemental wages, and what amount they should be paid—issues that seem to have generated considerable worker discontent. Managers and foremen interviewed in the Soviet press also have expressed concern about inequities in the system and a belief that modernization would accomplish the goals of the experiment more effectively than wage incentives. The experiment, however, continues. []

development (in areas such as housing, education, and medical services) as one way of increasing regional influence in the planning process. The concept of "comprehensive economic and social planning" was born in Leningrad and has been pushed especially hard in Moscow and Western Siberia, where one of the potential leaders, Fedirko, was the first to win the authority to develop a 10-year plan along these lines.⁹ []

⁹ In what may be a significant concession to such regional pressures, the Politburo in September 1983 granted the cities of Leningrad and Moscow an expansion of their previous planning rights—a move that could presage some eventual widening of discretionary authority in other localities. The extent of this devolution of central functions to local planners remains unclear; according to former Leningrad Oblast First Secretary Zaykov, however, central plans—starting with the next five-year plan (1986-90)—will carry no detailed breakdowns for Leningrad, and the city will have more responsibility for distributing and using its designated funds. []

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Regional party leaders also have initiated local management experiments, such as those previously described, that have been designed to expand their authority, but these have been carefully circumscribed and closely monitored by Moscow. L'vov Oblast First Secretary Dobrik once denied that he was under such close supervision, telling a Western reporter that Moscow gave him complete freedom to act and experiment. "In fact, Moscow is sometimes surprised at what we do," he said. The interviewer then asked who decided that the local television factory should switch to color only. "The ministry in Moscow," Dobrik conceded. Then he indicated one of the ways Moscow can make its decisions more palatable: "But we're getting the biggest color TV institute in the country." [redacted]

Selective Endorsements

Officials in this sample also have been fairly selective in their endorsements of existing management forms and practices. Those ideas that enjoy the strongest support—and the reasons given for that support—also may be indicative of perspectives these officials would bring to the Politburo and Secretariat. [redacted]

Production Associations. Officials in this sample have been enthusiastic about the creation of production associations—organizations designed to coordinate the activities of related enterprises under a single management organ. Production associations have been officially designated as the economy's "basic self-financing units," and it is the self-financing aspect (requiring associations to cover operating expenses out of revenues) that often is praised by these officials, as well as by Gorbachev, for its beneficial effects on productivity. Regional party officials also believe these associations strengthen the local level of economic management, where the influence of local party organizations can more easily be brought to bear. In sum, they consider the formation of production associations to be—in the words of Gor'kiy Oblast First Secretary Yuriy Khristoradnov—a step toward "sensibly combining local and national interests" and surmounting "still visible departmental barriers." (These officials remain critical, however, of the "mechanical" formation of production associations and of their frequent failure to be organized on an interdepartmental basis as was originally intended.) [redacted]

Agro-Industrial Associations. Although agro-industrial associations are not self-financing, the other virtues these officials ascribe to them are similar to those attributed to production associations. Officially sanctioned in May 1982, agro-industrial associations were created to bring the various components of the agro-industrial complex together under a single administrative hierarchy that could coordinate the entire food-production process. Because the *rayon* (district) associations are organized on a territorial basis and empowered to distribute some resources within that territory, they have the support of most local officials, who generally favor any moves that increase local discretionary authority. Agro-industrial associations, wrote Kuybyshev Oblast First Secretary Yevgeniy Murav'yev, are a "practical solution to one of the most important problems in contemporary economic policy—a rational combination of sectoral and territorial management principles." [redacted]

Contract Brigades. Most oblast and kray leaders in this group also seem enthusiastic about the use of "contract brigades"—a form of labor organization that links the income of individual workers to the output of their work teams (brigades)—in construction and industry. They believe that by tying individual income to group output, laggards are less likely to be tolerated by their peers and labor discipline and productivity will increase. Officials in this group seldom refer to the use of brigades in agriculture, however, suggesting little enthusiasm about their application in that sector, where the nature of the work gives these organizations a wider degree of decision-making latitude and makes them less subject to local party control. Despite these misgivings, the contract brigades have been approved for nationwide adoption in agriculture and have Gorbachev's strong backing. [redacted]

Target Programing. The so-called program-goal approach to planning—focusing attention and resources on national or regional problems that cut across sectoral lines—is seen by officials in this group as one of the more effective means of coping with departmental barriers. ("Life has proven" the efficiency of

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this method, wrote former Sverdlovsk Oblast First Secretary Yel'tsin.) Although the program-goal approach is helping to eliminate such barriers from the *planning* phase, it also appears to be heightening these officials' awareness of the need for commensurate changes in the management structure, which continues to be organized along sectoral lines.

The Party's Role

Despite their desire for increased regional control, officials in this sample do not seem to favor a more strongly interventionist role for the party in economic management. For example, Voronezh Oblast First Secretary Vadim Ignatov has complained that certain of his section chiefs and even oblast secretaries "personally attend to minor day-to-day economic questions." According to Ignatov, this stifles the initiative of economic managers, who "get used to the idea that they can work without effort, without rolling up their sleeves." Former Kemerovo Oblast First Secretary Gorshkov cited what he described as a typical daily schedule of the manager of the *Stroymekhanizatsiya* Trust:

- | | |
|------|---|
| 0830 | Meeting of a "holiday commission" of the city party committee |
| 1100 | Meeting of the party staff for construction of a city sewage system |
| 1330 | Meeting of the party staff for construction of the <i>Azot</i> Production Association |
| 1500 | Meeting of the party staff for construction of a wood paneling factory |
| 1600 | Meeting of the Leningrad Rayon Party Committee |

This example illustrates, wrote Gorshkov, how party committees place unfair demands on economic managers and "waste their time" with unnecessary meetings. In short, the message conveyed by these officials is similar to the one that both Chernenko and Gorbachev seem to have pushed—that the party must oversee and control, but never substitute for, economic managers.

Reform: How High on the Agenda?

In sum, these statements suggest general agreement on the need for planning and management reforms that would include the devolution of additional authority to the regional level and a consolidation of narrowly specialized central organs, accompanied by greater utilization of the program-goal approach and a number of self-financing schemes designed to improve productivity. There appear to be wide variations, however, in the priority these officials attach to such reforms.


This was the only issue, moreover, on which we found statistically significant generational differences among potential leaders. Those officials who joined the party after Stalin's death were more likely than older officials in the sample to be critical of existing planning and management practices and to propose their own local "solutions" to national problems (see figure 10). George Breslauer's study of 24 oblast first secretaries in the RSFSR also found that complaints from younger officials were likely to be *qualitatively* different from those of their elders—ranking higher on his scale of "demandingness" and "impatience" with central policies.¹⁰ Even among representatives of the post-Stalin generation, however, our study found significant individual differences, ranging from those who appeared relatively unconcerned about the issue, such as Kiev city party leader Yuriy Yel'chenko, to Krasnoyarsk Kray party chief Fedirko, who made at least 16 statements that were critical of central planning and management policies during the period under review.¹¹

Whatever their priority, the modest measures these officials are advocating seem unlikely to have a liberalizing influence on the Soviet system. To judge

¹⁰ *Policy Orientations of Provincial Party First Secretaries in the Russian Republic of the USSR*, by George Breslauer, National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1983.

¹¹ Breslauer also found the post-Stalin generation to be highly polarized in terms of its demandingness and impatience with central policies.

Figure 10
Complaints by Potential Leaders
About Soviet Central Planners and Managers,
1978-84



from their statements, for example, their attraction to the notion of contract brigades, which link individual income to group output, is not based upon a wish to foster an entrepreneurial spirit at the workplace but, rather, on a desire to exploit the more oppressive effect of the scheme—namely, an increase in peer pressure, which is said to improve labor discipline and, hence, productivity. [redacted]

Most officials in this sample, in fact, have consistently stressed the importance of improving labor discipline as a means of increasing production capacity—a theme they emphasized even before it became de rigueur under former party chief Andropov. *Pravda* editor Afans'yev, for example, observed that “raising individual responsibility and consolidating order and discipline produce a substantial economic, political, and moral effect—without increased material expenditures.” Many regional officials also have boasted about the efficiencies achieved through increased labor discipline. L'vov Oblast First Secretary Dobrik went even further than most officials in this sample, proposing that labor discipline be stiffened by introducing “specific penalties” for “irresponsible work”—“negative incentives” of the type Gorbachev has since endorsed. [redacted]



Deputy ©

Figure 11. Krasnoyarsk Kray First Secretary Fedirko—one of the more vocal critics of central planning and management policies. [redacted]

Resource Allocations

On resource allocation issues, there are some striking differences of emphasis among these officials—explainable for the most part by their differing constituencies and responsibilities. For example, local party leaders, unlike members of the defense establishment, seldom have occasion to comment on the country's defense needs. This study also showed, however, that the position an official takes on this issue cannot be predicted solely on the basis of his institutional affiliation, lending support to our assumption that such public pronouncements do, in fact, reflect a degree of personal policy preference. The statements of these officials also suggest strong support for increased resource allocations for social and consumer programs. A minority, however, have expressed concern about the excesses of “consumerism” or stressed the need to build a stronger defense with apparent disregard for the impact this would have on other sectors of the economy. [redacted]

Consumer Needs. With the exception of defense officials, members of this sample group—including those from areas where heavy industry predominates—have given particular emphasis to the importance of consumer and social needs. This holds true throughout the last half of the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), when heavy industry was assigned a priority growth rate, as well as the first half of the 11th (1981-85), when the consumer sector was so favored.

On this issue, therefore, the rhetoric of these officials has sometimes been out of step with national policy. Moreover, the explicit linkage that many of these officials make between the satisfaction of consumer needs and improvements in labor productivity suggests that this is not merely an effort to identify themselves with popular concerns. Several officials in this sample took the position of L'vov Oblast's Dobrik, who said that every industrial enterprise, "regardless of its departmental jurisdiction," should be involved in the production of goods for the people. [redacted]

Similarly, the strong concern these officials express about the need to improve the quality of life and "social infrastructure" (schools, medical facilities, cultural and recreational amenities, and so on) seems to be motivated less by their commitment to consumer welfare than their efforts to improve productivity and attract and retain an adequate work force. "In the difficult conditions of Siberia," said Krasnoyarsk Kray party chief Fedirko, "it is especially important to have good housing, kindergartens, polyclinics, hospitals, theaters, concert halls, and sports facilities. The mood of the people and the creation of stable work collectives depends on this." [redacted]

Although these officials seldom acknowledge a competition for resources between the consumer sector and defense, most of those who have done so have hinted that consumer interests should not be sacrificed. Moscow Oblast First Secretary Konotop said that workers within his jurisdiction were especially grateful that "under conditions of a complicated and strained international situation, there has been a firm, consistent implementation of the program to improve Soviet citizens' material and cultural standard of living." Central Committee official Zagladin, who has expressed concern about socialism's inability to match capitalism's production of consumer goods, acknowledged in 1983 "that new efforts in the defense sphere do not make it easier to fulfill the peaceful and creative tasks facing socialism." Zagladin went on, however, to indicate that the Soviet economy was sufficiently strong to produce both guns and butter. [redacted]

Despite the consumer orientation of a majority of officials in our sample, a minority have voiced concerns similar to those that have been raised by

Politburo members Aliyev and Solomentsev about the excesses of "consumerism." A few officials, for example, talked about the need to develop "sensible" patterns of consumption, and Altay Kray's Aksenov worried that material well-being could lead to selfishness, "money grubbing," and neglect of the responsibilities of Soviet citizenship. [redacted]

Defense. Members of the defense establishment in this sample have been unanimous in calling for an improvement in the country's defense capability, but they generally have described this as a longstanding concern—not one that requires any new diversion of resources. For example, Marshal Akhromeyev, who was later to become chief of the General Staff, wrote in January 1984: "The party and the Soviet Government have never overlooked the question of strengthening the nation's defense might." The armed forces, he wrote, "are receiving a sufficient amount of modern combat equipment" and only need better training in the use of that equipment. Like Akhromeyev, these officials generally have defined "increased defense capabilities" in terms of increased combat readiness, better training, and more efficiency—not increased resources. Most of them have acknowledged the legitimacy of other sectors' claims on the resource pie by conceding that a strong defense depends, first and foremost, upon a strong economy. For example, Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov has written that "the Soviet people are strengthening and developing the country's economic and, *consequently*, defense might" (emphasis added). [redacted]

There is some evidence, however, that others, such as First Deputy Defense Minister Vasiliy Petrov and Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov, have approached the issue from a somewhat narrower perspective. Petrov, for example, once used the analogy of the limited resources of the post-World War II period to praise the party's efforts to strengthen national defense. "In this situation," he wrote, "despite the difficulties of postwar reconstruction, the Communist Party took the necessary measures to further strengthen the country's defense capability and increase its armed forces' combat might." [redacted]

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Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov also has been an advocate of programs that could be interpreted as an implicit call for additional resources. For example, he has stressed the need to be at the forefront of military technology development to meet the challenge of NATO's advanced conventional weapons and the US Strategic Defense Initiative. Ogarkov also has called for measures to speed up the mobilization deployment of the armed forces and the transfer of the Soviet economy to a wartime footing—an issue that appears to bear on the overall question of resource allocation at a time of economic strain. [REDACTED]

Investment. Although officials in this sample have dropped hints about how they believe the resource pie should be sliced (by emphasizing the importance of one or another sector of the economy), they have seldom made even veiled calls for increases in capital investment. Despite their concern about obsolescence, for example, only L'vov Oblast's Dobrik has talked about the need to "invest resources" in the updating of equipment and manufacturing processes—Gorbachev's proposed solution to the problem. This reticence on the issue of investment may reflect a recognition by these officials of their limited ability to influence Moscow's policies as well as their understanding of prevailing economic realities. If more resources are to be devoted to consumer and social needs, as most of these officials seem to be advocating, and defense spending is to be maintained at an "adequate" level, which most seem to equate with its current growth rate, then any increase in investment probably would have to come from increased productivity and savings. [REDACTED]

Ideological Vigilance and Dissent

In comparison with economic issues, officials in this sample have devoted little attention to ideological work and propaganda. The chief exceptions have been officials from border and port areas, such as former

Leningrad party chief Zaykov and L'vov Oblast first secretary Dobrik, who have emphasized the need for vigilance against the contamination of foreign ideas. For example, Dobrik, whose oblast borders Poland, wrote that "our ideological enemy is trying to awaken vestiges of the past in the consciousness of some people"—their private-property inclinations, religious dealings, and "manifestations of national narrowness" (that is, Ukrainian nationalism). Dobrik has decried the activities of "subversive organizations," such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and called for the party to play a more active role in combating "bourgeois" propaganda. [REDACTED]

Pravda editor Afanas'yev also has written on the issue, proposing that officials involved in countering such propaganda revise their tactics. "There are still some in our midst," he wrote, "who think that the stronger the language they use in reviling our foe, the more resounding their victory in the ideological battle. It appears that some find it difficult to discard the sloganeering, noisiness, and misplaced emotions that still prevail in some materials. Emotions are no substitute for truth, nor is noisiness a method of attack." [REDACTED]

None of these statements contains any hint of leniency toward "alien ideas" or the Soviet dissidents who might espouse them. Even Central Committee official Zagladin, who has taken somewhat unorthodox positions on other issues, has defended the Soviet Union's denial of rights to a "tiny, insignificant group of people," claiming this "enables us to guarantee the rights of society as a whole and of each member individually." [REDACTED]

Nationalities Issues. Statements on this issue also contain little evidence of concern about nationalist dissent, in part because most officials in the sample come from areas without sizable ethnic minorities. An exception is L'vov's Dobrik, whose oblast has a population that is less than 8 percent Russian and that was not integrated into the USSR until after World War II. To combat Ukrainian nationalism in his oblast, Dobrik has organized public meetings to discuss its

Self-Image

When these potential Politburo members describe the qualities of a "good leader"—a designation they presumably would apply to themselves—they paint the following composite portrait. [redacted]

The good leader is politically mature, well educated, and selfless in his devotion to the party and the people. He has strong organizational skills and knows how to set priorities and concentrate on his main goals. He also knows how to mobilize people to fulfill those goals. This is a man who doesn't sit around in his office but keeps in close contact with the workers and listens carefully to their problems and suggestions. He does everything he can to improve their working conditions and the quality of their everyday lives. He serves as an example to his subordinates. Although he has exacting expectations of them, he considers dismissal to be an extreme measure that generally can be avoided. He is constantly mastering new skills and progressive methods of management. He is able to foresee the long-term consequences of decisions and to predict future needs. Despite these superior personal qualities, he is always careful to observe the principle of collectivity in the formulation of decisions. He is, in short, a leader "of the Leninist type." [redacted]

"bloody" history, complete with presentations by relatives of the victims of past atrocities.¹² Marshal Ogarkov also has alluded to a resistance to the Russian language among ethnic minorities that has created problems in training draftees.¹³ Ogarkov was the only national-level figure in the sample, however, to comment on such issues—a fact that presumably reflects the current absence of any widespread, politically disruptive protest or dissent by ethnic minorities.

¹² Dobrik has special reason to be concerned with this issue. His predecessor, Vasily Kutsevol, was removed from his post in 1973 following disturbances among L'vov University students protesting Russification efforts. [redacted]

¹³ As of 1980, non-Slavs represented about one-third of the draft-age population. [redacted]

Prospects

To judge from this sample of Soviet officials eligible for promotion to the Politburo and Secretariat, turnover in the top-level leadership will not mean the rise of a single political generation. Instead, as was true in the first round of promotions under Gorbachev, new Soviet leaders are likely to be drawn from several different age groups. Those promoted to the Politburo at the April 1985 plenum, for example, ranged in age from 55 (CPSU Secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov, who became a full member) to 73 (Defense Minister Sokolov, who became a candidate member). [redacted]

Domestic Impact

On the issue of economic reform, these officials may all be described as "conservative" in the sense that any changes they seem to favor would preserve the system's basic features of state ownership and central planning. An analysis of their complaints, initiatives, and endorsements, however, suggests that as national leaders most of them would support a package of modest "reform" measures that included:

- The devolution of some additional planning and management authority, especially in the "social welfare" area, to the regional level.
- The merging of narrowly specialized ministries and state committees.
- Greater utilization of the program-goal approach to planning and the creation of interdepartmental organs to manage target programs.
- Increased operational authority for agro-industrial and production associations.
- Greater emphasis on self-financing contract brigades and similar measures designed to improve productivity. [redacted]

There appear to be wide variations, however, in the priority these officials would attach to such reforms. Attitudes among this sample group of potential leaders ranged from those of Kiev city party leader Yuriy Yel'chenko, who appeared relatively complacent

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about present practices, to those of Krasnoyarsk Kray party chief Petr Fedirko, who issued at least 16 statements that were critical of central planning and management during the period under review. []

As Politburo members, these officials would be weighing the relative merits of resource claims from all regions and sectors of the economy—a task none of them has faced to date. The current statements of these officials, nevertheless, suggest:

- Strong sentiment in favor of additional resources for social and consumer programs, with proponents basing their case on the benefits that would accrue to the economy as a whole.
- A disinclination, under present circumstances, to make a substantial increase in the growth rate of defense spending, which most appear to consider adequate to meet projected needs.
- An apparent belief that current defense spending levels are realistic, however, and that any increase in allocations to meet social needs would have to be made at the expense of capital investment, rather than defense. []

These statements also suggest, however, that such resource allocations issues will be contentious. A minority group among these officials has expressed concern about the potential excesses of “consumerism” and stressed the need to build a stronger defense with apparent disregard for the impact this would have on other sectors of the economy. []

The comments of these officials also suggest that their entry into the Politburo or Secretariat probably would have little effect on the plight of Soviet dissidents. The silence of most officials on this issue may simply reflect their indifference to an issue that is not of major concern to them in their current posts. Those who have spoken out on the subject and those most likely to assume positions as cultural and ideological “watchdogs” have taken a predictably orthodox and unyielding line. []

Impact on International Behavior

Foreign policy issues are rarely addressed by most of these potential leaders and are of secondary concern

to them in their current positions. As Politburo members, therefore, the domestic repercussions of foreign policy decisions probably would weigh heavily in their consideration of policy options, at least at the outset of their tenures. The dismay so many of these officials have expressed over the country’s technological backwardness—coupled with their apparent belief that the investment required to solve that problem should await fulfillment of more urgent social and consumer needs—suggests a strong appreciation of the technological benefits of improved East-West relations. Judging from their statements, such potential benefits now seem to outweigh their concerns about the ideological “contamination” that would result from increased contacts with the West. Although sensitive to their technological inferiority to the West, they have voiced little sentiment for an autarkic approach similar to that pursued under Stalin and advocated by such leading contemporary figures as Academy of Sciences President Anatoliy Aleksandrov. []

The expertise of leaders who would be drawn from the foreign affairs and national security establishments probably would give them a disproportionate influence in resolving such issues. There have been indications of sufficient differences among these officials, however, to suggest that US interests could be affected by the outcome of the selection process:

- In the Central Committee apparatus, Zagladin appears to be more flexible and less inclined to see issues in strictly ideological terms than his colleague, Zamyatin.

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somewhere between Stalinist orthodoxy and a significant liberalization of the system, coupling a continuation of many present policies with a modest degree of change, particularly in the area of economic management. []

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Regardless of who is selected, however, the statements of these officials leave no doubt about the continued centrality of the United States in any future Soviet foreign policy considerations. They also suggest the existence of a consensus about the value of pursuing additional arms-control agreements with the United States. For some, these agreements may be desirable simply to facilitate Soviet planning and lessen the possibility of technological surprise. For those who would devote additional resources to nondefense programs, however, the cost-avoidance benefits of such agreements appear to give them a high priority. []

Even such modest changes may be difficult to implement, given the constraints of a collective leadership and traditional bureaucratic resistance. Unlike Andropov and Chernenko, however, Gorbachev is relatively young and healthy and appears to be trying to build a coalition for change. If so, the range of views among these officials suggests that the turnover in the Politburo will not automatically provide the kind of leaders he needs and that his success will be dependent on his ability to maintain control of the selection process. []

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Judging from their statements, these potential Politburo members are not inclined to be any more lenient in their dealings with their East European allies or with Eurocommunists than the leaders they would be replacing. Although they presumably would leave the door open to improved relations with the Chinese, there appears to be little optimism that a normalization of relations will come soon. There also seems to be a lack of enthusiasm among these officials about aid to Third World countries, possibly reflecting some concern about the burden such assistance places on the Soviet economy. The Middle East, by contrast, appears to be recognized as an area of strategic geopolitical importance for which the cost of Soviet involvement may be less subject to question. []

On the other hand, a number of these officials appear to hold views similar to Gorbachev's—especially in the economic area, where many (such as Fedirko and Zaykov) seem to share his belief that management has become overly centralized and that greater emphasis should be placed on financial incentives. Among the foreign policy specialists, some (such as Zagladin) have also deemphasized ideological polemics when they thought it served Soviet interests, demonstrating a compatibility with Gorbachev's more tactically flexible approach. If Gorbachev can gain control of the cadre selection process—and the recent pattern of promotions indicates that he is doing so—he should be able to ensure that he has the policy support he needs to push his domestic and foreign policy agenda. []

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In sum, these statements provide no evidence that the turnover in the leadership will by itself bring a readymade coalition for across-the-board changes in Soviet policy. On many issues, the views of potential Politburo and Secretariat members appear about the same as those of the leaders they would succeed, arguing for policy continuity. On others, the divergence of views among these officials suggests that the policy impact will be dependent on the outcome of the selection process. On still other issues, there appears to be a consensus for change, but with varying perceptions of the urgency involved. [] Most members of the group seem to favor a course that lies

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Appendix A

Statements on Soviet-US Relations

At the beginning of the eighties, with the coming to power of the new US administration, the leading circles of imperialism, setting a course of confrontation and outright antagonism, have openly launched a global offensive on socialism, based on a carefully elaborated, large-scale program covering all aspects of the struggle up to and including brinkmanship.

Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov

The reactionary forces are making foolish plans to dominate the world, pushing mankind to the brink of nuclear disaster, and directly interfering in peoples' affairs. This crazy policy is first of all apparent in the efforts by the United States, its allies, and NATO to disturb the military balance and to deploy nuclear missiles in the West.

Leonid Smirnov

We counter the imperialists' hostile intrigues and the new US administration's adventurist statements with our boundless devotion to Communist ideals, the Soviet people's monolithic cohesion around the party, and new successes in building the economy and culture.

Yuriy Khristoradnov

The United States has adopted a policy of a large-scale, total arms race, which harbors a serious new threat to peace and the people's security. . . . Mankind is threatened with war on land and from space, which aggressive US forces also wish to turn into an arena of the lethal arms race.

Marshal Viktor Kulikov

Reagan seems to have forgotten with whom he is dealing. We are not El Salvador or Panama. We are a superpower, with the self-respect of a superpower.

Sergey Afanas'yev

The American strategists' hopes of weakening and exhausting us economically through the arms race and then dictating their will to socialism are unrealizable; they are refuted by the entire history of the Soviet state.

Leonid Zamyatin

We are convinced of the possibility of an improvement, or at least a normalization, of Soviet-US relations, and we hope for that.

Vadim Zagladin

The course of the present US administration, which thinks in terms of war and acts in accordance with its militarist plans, is very dangerous. It is aimed at gaining military superiority, and is convincingly apparent in the White House approach to nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks. The Soviet-US Geneva talks were wrecked through the fault of Washington.

Marshal Vasiliy Petrov

In conditions of the international situation, which has been aggravated through the fault of aggressive imperialist circles, the strict realization of established economic plans is not merely an obligation, but also the patriotic duty, of every Communist and every Soviet person.

Lev Zaykov

The US leadership is openly pursuing a policy that undermines detente and aggravates the international situation. It is trying to dictate its will to the socialist states and other countries. By expatiating on the defense of their "vital interests" and on the so-called Soviet military threat, and exploiting events in Afghanistan, the US ruling circles are concealing their own militarist plans.

Marshal Sergey Sokolov

If realism and a realistic appraisal of the actual situation in the world arena were to gain the upper hand in the United States over the narcotic of the "power of America," and if a realization of real US interests were to gain the upper hand over a policy founded on illusory interests, then confrontation would be rejected and a new turn would take place in US policy—a turn toward coexistence and peaceful cooperation. This turn is vitally necessary—necessary for everyone, including the United States itself.

Vadim Zagladin

A further intensification of the general crisis of capitalism and the weakening of its positions in the international arena have occurred in recent years. The imperialist circles are attempting to change the course of events in their favor and to halt the process of progressive historical changes by force. . . . The US militarists have embarked on the path of undermining detente, stepping up the arms race, constantly creating crisis situations, and grossly interfering in the domestic affairs of other states.

Yuriy Yel'chenko

Every Soviet person is profoundly conscious that there is no greater happiness than the happiness of working under peaceful skies. . . . The flywheel of the arms race, however, is being cranked up once again. The imperialists are covering up their aggressive aspirations with propaganda forgeries about the supposedly increased "Soviet military threat" and about our country's complicity in "international terrorism." In the Altay stands a memorial to stewardess Nadya Kurchenko. In the prime of her youth and beauty, her life was cut short by a bandit's bullet fired by the Brazinkas terrorists. These criminals have found shelter in the United States, from where absurd charges are made against the peace-loving, humane Soviet people.

Nikolay Aksenov

It is difficult to give assurance that the Reagan administration will change its policies. This is because the regime is serving the interests of a specific class, particularly the military-industrial complex.

Sergey Afanas'yev

In a conversation with a [redacted], Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev emphasized his personal desire for improved relations between the United States and the USSR. [redacted] between the two countries during World War II "against a common enemy" and stated [redacted] had formed a lasting impression on the Soviet people of his generation. Akhromeyev fondly recalled the period of "detente," which he characterized as a period of comparatively substantive discussions between [redacted] and the Soviet military. He dismissed the rhetoric of Soviet and US polemics by stating that while propaganda serves its purpose on both sides, "propaganda is propaganda." He emphasized the important responsibility of both Soviet and [redacted] [redacted] to forward information accurately and objectively to facilitate correct analysis. This was especially important, he said, because of biases inherent in each nation's leadership perspective.

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Appendix B

Criticism of Central Planners and Managers: A Sampler

Densely populated regions like Moscow Oblast urgently need comprehensive planning of future socioeconomic development, taking into account nature conservation, the fuel and energy balance, water supply, and other utilities. The solution of these problems currently depends largely on the mood of the ministries and sector departments of Gosplan, and we are constantly forced to beg money from them for numerous acute needs in the municipal services sphere.

Vasiliy Konotop

Considerable amounts of cement could be saved by the oblast's industrial construction enterprises by using the coal ash of the thermoelectric power plant. Every year more than 1 million tons of ash are produced by the Kuzbas power plants. However, the reason insignificant amounts of the ash are being used is that the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification has not resolved the problem of dry ash separation at operating power plants. This, however, would enable us to save 100,000 tons of cement every year.

Leonid Gorshkov

I believe that the problem of "departmentalism" is our greatest sore point. A ministry has its plans and interests and wishes to carry out its price policy, but what is done in the neighboring ministry is none of the former ministry's concern or only to a very limited extent.

Viktor Afanas'yev

We fully approve measures taken by the CPSU Central Committee . . . to restructure the work of the USSR Gosplan. . . . At the same time the system of management in a number of sectors remains split among many departments and remains extremely complex and inefficient. . . . Thus, there are today in our oblast 387 construction organizations subordinate to 36 ministries and departments. Many of them operate in parallel.

Boris Yel'tsin

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We have serious claims against the work style of the ministries. . . . In the activities of many of them we continue to see the predominance of bureaucratic, red-tape methods . . . the system that frequently predominates is the "play it safe" method.

Nikolay Slyun'kov

Our oblast produces 90 percent of the country's natural sulfur, but there is not enough of it to insure that operating enterprises work at full capacity, not to mention those now being built. The reason is that in the 10th Five-Year Plan, the USSR Gosplan channeled resources mainly into the development of production capacity and neglected development of the mineral mining base. There has been no change in the picture in 1981.

Viktor Dobrik

The growth rate of production is steadily increasing and, although the program for social development laid out in the Five-Year Plan was fulfilled, there is still a shortage of housing, institutions for children, and other domestic and cultural facilities. . . . We can understand this, but we cannot accept it, particularly because the lag in development of the social-domestic infrastructure is also the result of mistakes in planning and organizing work by the ministries participating in shaping the complex.

Gennadiy Bogomyakov

The USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources does not in practice participate in solving problems of water usage in the complex's zone. The question of the storage and utilization of industrial waste has not been solved. The Ministry of Power and Electrification, Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, and Ministry of Construction Materials Industry are not helping to work out a unified approach to the solution of this problem.

Petr Fedirko

Considerable timber resources remain unused, 45 percent of them because of the insufficient attention that the USSR Ministry of the Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry pays to the reconstruction and technical improvement of timber procurement and processing enterprises.

Leonid Gorshkov

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It would be desirable for construction ministries and planning organs to show greater concern for developing the industrial base, stabilizing cadres, and improving construction planning and administration.

Yuriy Khristoradnov

Most unfortunately, the leaders of a number of ministries are seeking to increase production not on the basis of improved labor productivity but mainly by means of expanding production areas and employing more people.

Vasiliy Konotop

I would like to note that the ministries and departments still have not tackled the job of quality control as they should; we are not aware of their energetic help.

Viktor Dobrik

Back in 1974 we drew up a plan for the protection of air and water from pollution by local enterprises. But it has never been realized—the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy has refused to supply the necessary resources.

Viktor Boyko

It is essential to increase the ministries' responsibility for accelerating the rate of retooling, the timely creation of new production capacities, and ensuring the fulfillment of the plans adopted. . . . Unfortunately, when compiling the plans for this year and the five-year plan, the USSR Ministry of Coal Industry is not providing for many of these measures. . . . At the oblast's ferrous metallurgy enterprises there is an urgent need to resolve more rapidly questions of the retooling and modernization of metallurgical plants. The obkom has made specific proposals on this matter to the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy.

Boris Kachura



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